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CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE TO HOUSING
Philp N. Brownstein *
Kenneth G. Lore**
Federal legislation affects all types of rental and purchased hous-
ing-standard multi-family and single-family rentals and traditional
single-family homes, cooperatives, and condominiums. Federal initia-
tives designed to stimulate the higher-income housing market generally
include programs without direct subsidy, such as tax benefits from
ownership and the encouragement of secondary mortgage markets.
Federal involvement has been significant in housing programs to assist
middle-income groups: tax benefits for homeowners, Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) insurance programs, middle-income rental pro-
grams, and to a certain extent tax-exempt financing vehicles. The fed-
eral government also has been committed consistently to assisting
lower-income persons through traditional public housing programs, the
Section 235 and 236 programs, rental assistance, rent supplement and
most recently the Section 8 housing assistance payments program. As
the federal role in housing changes, the critical issues relate to the level
of assistance and the targeting of benefits.
The current state of housing and the legislative impact of the 97th
Congress, looked at in tandem, provide less than salutary answers to
concerns about the effects that present federal policies will have on
housing. For whatever reasons, housing has lost much of its appeal in
Washington. Its attractiveness for the Reagan Administration has been
as an easy target for budget cutting. The housing lobby discovers again
and again it does not have the votes to influence legislative proposals.
While budget figures tell the story clearly-the HUD proposed budget
for 1984 represents a sixty percent cut1 in budget authority from Fiscal
Year 1983-most telling, perhaps, is not the paucity of housing legisla-
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Director, Loan Guaranty Service, Veterans Administration, 1958-1961 and Chief Benefits
Director, Veterans Administration, 1961-1963. B.A., George Washington University; LL.B.,
Columbus University, 1940; LL.M. Columbus University, 1941.
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tion but that the legislation that does impact on housing concerns is not
"housing legislation" at all.
Housing policy today, such as it is, is being shaped by those who
make financial policy. A close look at the legislative record of the last
two years clearly demonstrates a major change in the historical role the
federal government has taken in housing. The concentration on reduc-
tion of the federal budget has been paralleled by an articulated policy
of accelerating the withdrawal of the federal presence from housing.1
THE CHANGING STATE OF HOUSING
Despite some recent gains due to descending interest rates, in the
current economy housing remains a beleaguered industry. Even the
President, the industry's most reluctant partisan, has conceded that
"[flor millions of Americans, the dream of home ownership was shat-
tered by soaring costs, record interest rates and economic mismanage-
ment."3 Between 1977 and 1980 the average monthly payment for a
mortgage loan nearly doubled.4 Over a period when the prime rate of
interest reached twenty-one percent, the conventional commitment
rates for long-term home mortgages peaked at almost nineteen per-
cent.5 In 1982 work was begun on fewer than 1.1 million houses, the
lowest number of housing starts since 1946.6 In August 1982, the me-
dian sales price for new single-family homes was $73,900, with average
sales prices reaching $88,400. 7 When Congress was considering and
the President was rejecting a legislative stimulus for single-family
homes, the National Association of Realtors estimated the unsold over-
hang on the market at 275,000 houses.8
America's expectations always have included housing. In the 1970s
the dream of home ownership became entangled with another strand of
the same vision: financial security. George Sternlieb, director of the
Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University, has specu-
lated that we are becoming a "post-shelter" society in which housing
related decisions are dominated by investment decisions.9 In 1978,
California homes were increasing in price at 1.5% a month and one out
of every sixty Californians had a real estate license. By the summer of
1982, Californians were delinquent on mortgages totalling $1.7 bil-
2. U.S. Studies Shift in Allocating Housing Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982, at A18 (quoting
Robert Maffin, Executive Director of the National Association of Housing and Redevelop-
ment Officials) [hereinafter cited as Housing Funds].
3. Speech by President Reagan before the 1982 Annual Convention of the U.S. Savings League,
18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1491 (Nov. 22, 1982).
4. 10 HOUSING & DEV. REP. (BNA) 61 (June 21, 1982).
5. Mortgage Market Trends-October 1982, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct., 1982, at 154.
6. Kleinfield, Who Gains When Housing Prospers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, at Fl (midwest
ed.).
7. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1982).
8. Supra note 5.
9. See FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, HOUSING FINANCE IN THE EIGHTIES:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 20 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING FINANCE].
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lion.' ° In December 1982, when national unemployment levels
reached a discouraging 10.8%, unemployment in the lumber and con-
struction trades was holding at almost twenty-four percent."I Restric-
tive credit policies (which led to high interest rates), a tight rental
market, and tax policies, which frequently favored non-real estate in-
vestments, almost devastated the housing industry and severely
threatened the stability of those financial institutions dependent on
housing and long-term investment. 12
To understand how this crisis developed requires some understand-
ing of the favored position housing had obtained in the post-war de-
cades. During those years, demography, economics, and the thrust of
federal legislation combined to establish a particular priority for hous-
ing. The pent-up demand of the war years followed by the post-World
War II baby boom was met by federal legislative programs, such as the
Interstate Highway Trust Fund,'3 that encouraged the development of
suburban America and a boom in housing that peaked with a high of
two million starts in 1978.14
Over the same period, regulated financial institutions paid modest
rates for their money and, therefore, were eager to lend mortgage
money at low rates for the long-term. Financing had been prearranged
by the builders of new homes, or brokers selling existing houses, and
homebuyers simply could go to a mortgage company or to their local
bank or savings and loan to borrow the necessary funds. It was the
golden age of the long-term, fixed rate mortgage. In addition to cheap
money and a modest rate of inflation, an expanding economy provided
jobs and prospects of advancement for almost every new householder.
The prosperous suburban homeowner, in a rising economy, could take
smug satisfaction in the best investment he ever made: a house. There
was a tremendous increase in homeowner equity as houses appreciated
at an average annual rate of fourteen percent. 15
Those halcyon post-war years were characterized by federal legisla-
tion that made home ownership possible for two-thirds of United States
households' 6 and that responded to the need for improved housing for
low- and moderate-income families. Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans Administration programs eased purchase for
10. Yates, California Bust: Boom to Time Bomb in the Golden State, Washington Post, Aug. 21,
1982, at FI, col. 1.
11. Id.
12. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., FINANCING THE HOUSING NEEDS OF THE 1980S: A PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT ON HOUSING FINANCE 17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY
REPORT].
13. Highway Revenue Act of 1956, 2 U.S.C. § 209 (1976).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., 1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT 4
(1980) [hereinafter cited as PRODUCTION REPORT].
15. Salkin & Durning, What is a House Really Worth?, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct., 1982, at 10.
16. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: ALTERNATIVE AP-
PROACHES 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES].
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homebuyers. 7 Federal legislation ensured the availability of low inter-
est rates from savings accounts 8 and the federal tax laws enabled
homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes from their
taxable income and to reduce their capital gains.19 Housing, and par-
ticularly home ownership, then, benefited from an easy monetary pol-
icy, tax breaks low interest rates, and a series of legislative initiatives
that focused directly on housing.
The same years saw a steadily increasing federal involvement in the
production and subsidy of housing for low-income families. The pub-
lic housing program dates back to an early effort of the Public Works
Administration in 1933,20 but is firmly grounded in the United States
Housing Act of 1937.21 The Housing and Urban Development Act of
196822 authorized both the Section 236 program,23 a subsidized interest
reduction program to rental and cooperative housing for lower-income
families, and Section 235,24 a similar interest reduction program for
homeowners. The Section 8 program2 has been the most recent fed-
eral vehicle to provide housing assistance primarily to lower-income
renters. In light of current developments it is important to note that
while federal assistance for subsidized housing represents only a mod-
est proportion of housing activity,2 6 it is an involvement that is magni-
fied in importance at times when the economy takes a downturn and
when circumstances, as in the period under discussion, create a housing
recession considerably worse than the general downturn of the
economy.
THE CHANGING CREDIT MARKET
As a result of shifts in the economy during the past decade and a
half, the housing industry finds itself operating in an exceedingly
changed credit market. From 1965 to 1978 the average annual growth
of net business investment fell nearly fifty percent, a development
many analysts saw as a major reason for declining productivity.27 From
1969 to 1979 housing prices rose an unprecedented 150%.28 These de-
17. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE TAX TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 71-72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as TAX TREATMENT].
18. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-4.
19. TAX TREATMENT, supra note 17, at xi.
20. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, tit. II, 48 Stat 195, 200 (1933).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1978) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1437 (1978) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 1, 1968, 82 Stat. 504).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1980).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1980).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1978) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888).
Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937 was substantially amended and lower-income rental
assistance began by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1974).
26. Although the net impact of federal assistance on the construction industry is uneven, feder-
ally assisted multifamily construction represents an increasing share of that submarket, per-
haps two-thirds of all multifamily starts in 1980. See ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, sUpra note
16, at 11-12.
27. TAX TREATMENT, supra note 17, at xiii.
28. Id at 36.
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velopments took place against the troublesome backdrop of a sagging
economy interrupted only by weak periods of recovery, a mounting
federal deficit that weighed heavily on credit markets and consumer
confidence, a seemingly intractable upward rate of inflation, and a con-
sistent upward climb in the rate of unemployment.
At least two areas of change in the credit markets should be noted:
first, the development of a vigorous secondary market that is itself in a
period of change and, second, the explosive growth of a virtual super-
market of financial alternatives that may be redefining banking and the
role of the traditional thrift institutions. A reliable supply of mortgage
credit over the long term is critical for housing. Traditionally mortgage
loans were made in "primary" markets by lenders to borrowers.29
Often such mortgages were held as long-term assets in the portfolio of
the originating institution, but in many cases, and with increasing fre-
quency in the last decade, originators have sold their loans on secon-
dary markets, replenishing their available loan funds. °
The major development in secondary mortgage markets over the
last ten years has been the introduction and the growth of pass-through
securities issued against pools of government underwritten and conven-
tional residential mortgage loans;3 the predominant actor has been the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA),32 although the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)3 3 recently has begun
to issue and guarantee such pass-through instruments. In addition, the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation has initiated a significant
program based on participation certificates, conceptually similar to
pass-through securities. Such securities also have been issued by pri-
vate issuers through public offerings or private placements.3
The share of residential mortgages involving federal and federally-
related credit agencies has more than doubled since the 1950's. In the
housing downswing under discussion, however, federal agencies and
federal legislation have provided a lesser share of support for mort-
gages and housing activity than in other recent periods of instability.35
There are at least two response levels where the system of housing
credit falters. In the first instance, under a deteriorating economic en-
vironment, there is a not unexpected sensitivity of demand for mort-
29. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 12, at 15.
30. Id at 7. See also PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 73; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., GNMA ANNUAL REPORT 1980 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GNMA 1980
REPORT].
31. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 12, at 54.
32. PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 75. The GNMA is a government corporation estab-
lished to administer mortgage support programs which cannot be managed in the private
mortgage market. GNMA 1980 REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
33. PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 75. The FNMA is a private corporation established
to provide secondary support for the private residential mortgage market. GNMA 1980
REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
34. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 12.
35. At the same time, changes in federal law and regulation since 1980 have limited the volume
of tax-exempt revenue bond financing available to housing. See Brownstein & Lore, TEFRA
Revises Tax Liabilities of Multiunit Rentals, Legal Times, Dec. 6, 1982, at 21.
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gage credit relative to interest rate sensitivity in the overall economy.
As interest rates rise, mortgage credit demand plummets.3 6 Second,
"the increasingly wide swings in residential mortgage and housing con-
struction activity also are traceable to structural shortcomings in the
housing finance system.""7
Accelerated inflation and high interest rates affected the climate for
secondary market investors at the same time that a growing number of
real estate transactions were financed outside "traditional" institutional
lending channels-the thrift institutions.38 The plight of the thrifts has
been well documented and publicized. Despite ongoing federal efforts
to address those problems, however, their recorded losses continued
into the fourth quarter of 1982.39 Over the same period the budgetary
thrust of the administration was to diminish federal support for the
secondary credit market, particularly in the matter of funding for the
Government National Mortgage Association.4°
THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD
Federal Appropriations
Budget proposals are perhaps one of the clearest indications of
housing's diminished claim on federal resources. One of the Reagan
administration's first, and indeed determinative, actions on assuming
office was to revise the final budget shaped by the Carter Administra-
tion. A responsive Congress acted in 1981 to reduce federal spending
for housing by nearly fifty percent.4
This budget shift represents not only a fiscal cutback, but a
profound policy shift. Section 8 budgets from 1974 through 1980, for
example, placed considerable emphasis on new construction and sub-
stantial rehabilitation, which translate into new production and addi-
tions to the existing stock.42 For Fiscal Year 1980, fully half the
Section 8 units were to be new or substantial rehabilitation.43 A radical
change is evidenced in the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment's (HUD) recommended legislative program for Fiscal Year
1983. HUD proposed a sharply reduced subsidized housing program
that would eliminate three housing rehabilitation programs in favor of
a block grant, establish a direct rental subsidy for very low income
families, and provide an extremely modest new construction program
36. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON Hous-
ING xxi (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
37. Id at 116.
38. Brownstein & Lore, supra .note 35.
39. Troubled Thrifts, Book Review, THE BROOKINGS BULLETIN, Winter-Spring 1982, at 18.
40. Brownstein & Lore, supra note 35, at 166-67. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. AND URBAN
DEV., GNMA ANNUAL REPORT 1981, 1 (1982).
41. See Reagan Condemns Public Housing, DOLLARS & SENSE, Apr., 1983, at 12.
42. Brownstein & Lore, supra note 35, at 12.




for housing for the elderly.' No funding has been proposed for new
Section 8 construction or substantial rehabilitation. Whatever empha-
sis the Administration is willing to give to housing today will focus on
improvement of the existing housing stock, which may represent an-
other housing irony: the disenfranchisement of the private developer
in terms of assisted housing in an Administration committed to the free
market.
Since the 1968 Housing Act,45 the flow of federal subsidy funds,
outside of public housing, has been tied to the applications from pri-
vate developers, often working with local development agencies, to
build low and moderate-income assisted housing.46 The last hurrah in
this area could well be the construction of those Section 8 projects re-
maining "in the pipeline"; current legislation mandated HUD and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to release funds to make
possible those projects under construction by October 1, 1982. 47 Lower
interest rates and the extension of the construction date for projects
using Financing Adjustment Factor funds48 to January 1, 1983 is likely
to make possible a number of additional Section 8 units, although the
bulk of the projects pushed construction starts forward to meet the ear-
lier deadline.
The direction posited in the earliest Reagan budget proposals has
remained constant during the first two years of his Administration,
even as housing moved into a deepening depression. The fate of one
new housing proposal in the 97th Congress and the status of other
housing legislation emphasize the modest priority accorded to housing
and the determined withdrawal of the federal involvement.
Single Family Initiative
The only new housing initiative in the 97th Congress was the single
family mortgage subsidy bill, originally introduced as S. 2226 by Sena-
tor Richard Lugar (R- Ind.).49 While there is no question that this was
a special purpose bill,50 no one should have overestimated its prospects
for enactment, given the critical importance the Reagan Administra-
tion placed on reducing the federal budget. Despite the bill's price tag,
there were economic arguments that the bill could have had some turn-
around effect on housing, construction, and interrelated industries.
S. 2226 would have provided funds to write down interest rates on
44. See The Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-526,
94 Stat. 3044 (1980).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1437 (1978), supra note 23.
46. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time ofFiscalAusterity: The Trend To-
ward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URn. LAW. 249, 255 (1982).
47. 10 Housrmo & DEa. REP. (BNA) 310 (Sept. 13, 1982).
48. Continuing Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186 (1982).
49. S. 2226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S4049 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1982).
50. When S. 2226 was reported out of the Banking Committee, the Senators stated: "The Com-
mittee has not created a permanent housing program, it has created a short-term emergency
stimulus program." S. REP. No. 362, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
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new homes by as much as four percentage points, to a minimum of
eleven percent, during the first five years of a mortgage. The bill au-
thorized $3 billion for such assistance: $2.5 billion to subsidize homes
built between the date of enactment and November 3, 1983; $400 mil-
lion for homes purchased out of builder inventory; $100 million to
high-cost areas, subsidizing some part of mortgages exceeding the basic
mortgage limit for the program. In all instances, it was envisioned that
the entire subsidy would be repaid when an owner sold or refinanced
the home.51
In a series of legislative maneuvers, the single-family housing stim-
ulus program passed both Houses as part of an Urgent Supplemental
Appropriations bill, H.R. 5922.52 However, citing the three billion dol-
lar price tag and his commitment to economic recovery rather than spe-
cial industry assistance, the President vetoed the bill. 53 Without giving
inordinate symbolic weight to the failure of one bill to pass, the veto of
the single family subsidy bill, when viewed in tandem with the writing
off of Section 8 and other housing programs, and with the current
limbo into which assisted housing falls, can be read only as a direct
shift in national housing policy.
Assisted Housing
The assisted housing issue was not resolved until the brief lame
duck session of the 97th Congress. During the regular session the rou-
tine housing agenda remained deadlocked. Neither the housing appro-
priations nor the authorizing legislation was capable of passage. In a
struggle over dollars for assisted housing, the House and the Senate
were unable to agree on a compromise and did not adopt Fiscal Year
1983 housing authorization but were finally able to get a Presidential
signature on a compromise package on December 21, 1982."4
During the regular session, the Fiscal Year 1983 budget resolution
assumed a ceiling of $10.4 billion for assisted housing.55 The Senate
appropriations bill originally approved a level of only $3.8 billion. The
House had deferred action on the appropriations bill, however, pend-
ing passage of an authorization bill. Rather than accepting the lower
Senate figure, the House conferees argued successfully for deferring
consideration of funding for assisted programs. The 1983 HUD/In-
dependent Agencies Appropriations bill passed without any decision or
money for Section 8 assistance.5 While the post-election session did
51. Id.
52. H.R. 5922, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S6342 (daily ed. June 9, 1982).
53. 1981-82 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 34,518.
54. 10 HOUSING & DEV. REP. (BNA) 636 (Jan. 3, 1983). The bill contained money for Section
292, Section 8 and Indian housing.
55. S. Con. Res. 92, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
56. See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriation
Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-272, 96 Stat. 1160 (1982). While programs are funded, no men-
tion is made of Section 8 rental assistance.
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determine funding levels for assisted housing, that legislative deadlock
is, again, symbolic of housing's lack of priority today.
Tax Legislation
The attractiveness of housing and other real estate as an investment
has much to do with the tax incentives accorded to housing. Perhaps
the two major legislative achievements of the current administration in
the 97th Congress are the two tax bills, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA),57 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA)5 With the enactment of ERTA, the initial
reading was that tax incentives for housing, and particularly for low-
income housing, had improved.
For instance, ERTA contains several provisions that directly benefit
investment in residential real property. Major changes are made under
the Act's "Accelerated Cost Recovery System" in which most real es-
tate can be depreciated during a fifteen year period, a substantial bene-
fit compared to depreciation over the previous twenty to forty year
norm. 9 ERTA also retains some special treatment regarding recapture
of depreciation as ordinary income upon disposition of residential
property.60 Another benefit is that construction period interest and
taxes will not have to be capitalized and amortized in conjunction with
the construction of low-income rental housing; under prior law, such a
requirement would have been imposed after December 31, 1981.61
One important indirect tax change is likely to have a negative im-
pact on housing investment: the reduction in maximum tax rates.
Since the maximum tax on gross income now will be fifty percent-
reduced from seventy percent-investors may have less incentive to in-
vest in housing tax shelters." The reduction in maximum tax also pro-
duces a detrimental effect on tax-exempt bonds: the spread between
taxable and tax-exempt rates has narrowed to reflect the reduction in
benefits to a fifty percent taxpayer who would otherwise have been in a
seventy percent bracket, for example. The good news seems to be that
tax incentives for housing, and particularly low-income housing, have
improved. Less heartening for the long-term, however, is that, compar-
atively, tax incentives for other kinds of investment have improved
even more.63 For a number of reasons it is possible that money looking
for a place to go will go elsewhere.
57. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 176 (1981).
58. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 590
(1982).
59. I.R.C. § 168(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
60. I.R.C. § 1250 provides that only depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation will be
recaptured as ordinary income on a disposition of residential rental property, while § 1245
requires recapture of all depreciation for other assets. The scope of § 1245 was otherwise
greatly expanded by § 204 of ERTA.
61. I.R.C. § 189(b) (1982).
62. ERTA, supra note 57, at § 101.
63. Specifically, Title II's other "Business Incentive Provisions," -accelerated cost recovery, in-
vestment tax credit, research and experimentation, and small business rules--simplified and
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ERTA was billed as a triumph of supply-side economics. In a se-
mantic and philosophical reversal, the second tax bill, TEFRA, took
the opposite tack: "tax reform," in the President's words, to raise tax
revenues in the face of a $100 billion federal deficit. For housing and
real estate investment, the bottom line was a modest loss-but at a time
when the industry sector could least afford it.
TEFRA contains a number of provisions of substantial importance
to real estate and housing investment.' 4 An area of liberalization that
has been of particular importance to housing interests over the last two
years is that affecting the rules under IRC Section 103 regarding the
issuance of obligations that are exempt from the federal income tax.
The Administration, particularly the Department of the Treasury,
has held consistently negative positions with regard to extension of tax
exemption. Although the concern about the use of tax-exempt financ-
ing by states and local governments for single and multifamily housing
bonds developed late in the 1970's, the legislative and regulatory pace
of this matter has been a particular reminder that delay in itself some-
times is policy.6" The Treasury's proposed regulations on the use of
tax-exempt financing for multifamily housing exemplified the Adminis-
tration's intent to ignore housing policy in favor of a tax policy that in
many respects ignored or reflected an ignorance of housing finance.
The legislative and regulatory infighting as this issue moved toward
resolution made it quite clear that to the extent housing considerations
were weighed in these decisions, they were being evaluated and deter-
mined at the Department of the Treasury and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. It is consistent with recent developments pointing up
housing's low priority that those measures which impact on housing do
so almost peripherally: they are tax measures, budget measures, jobs
bills; they are not weighed against the needs of any coherent housing
policy.
The TEFRA provisions affecting housing overall have a liberalizing
effect. This is particularly apparent in Section 221, which addresses the
major problem for housing development in the proposed Treasury reg-
ulations for multifamily tax-exempt obligations. Prior to TEFRA, a
rental project, if financed with obligations exempt from federal income
taxes pursuant to IRC section 103(b)(4)(A) and issued prior to January
1, 1984, had to be maintained solely as a rental project for twenty years
or the term of the bond, whichever was greater; furthermore, twenty
made more attractive these other types of investments. See ERTA, supra note 57, §§ 201-
252.
64. For instance, §§ 231 and 232 of TEFRA, supra note 58, changed the rules for original issue
discount on industrial revenue bonds, and the tax treatment of stripped bonds and detached
coupons.
65. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 169. The issue of the use of revenue from tax-ex-
empt mortgage bonds was addressed by the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980. Pub.
L. No. 96-499, tit XI, subtit. A, 94 Stat. 2660 (1980). The 18-month hiatus before Treasury
issued its multi-family regulations placed considerable chill on the market for such bonds.
The new regulations, when they appeared, 47 Fed. Reg. 22,966 (May 26, 1982), went beyond
the intent of Congress in their rigidity.
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percent of the units had to be available for low to moderate income
families for the same period of time. In the context of current interest
notes, multifamily housing for low to moderate income families is eco-
nomically feasible only when flexibility exists to permit, for example,
ten-year terms with the option of conversion or some other alternative
at that time. A flat twenty-year term might be feasible where projects
could expect 100% Section 8 subsidies, but the developments under dis-
cussion, of course, parallel the absolute disappearance of new Section 8
funding authority.
Treasury took a relatively inflexible attitude in the regulations it
published and any modifications thereto. Various legislative efforts at
modification were unsuccessful until the enactment of TEFRA. Now,
under TEFRA, the low to moderate income requirement for bonds is-
sued after September 3, 1983, is to be the longer of 1) ten years after the
date on which half the units are first occupied; 2) one half the term of
the longest maturity obligation (including any refunding); or 3) the pe-
riod during which the project receives Section 8 assistance. All units in
a project, including those other than the low to moderate income set
aside, must remain as rentals for the duration of the low-income re-
quirement or the remaining term of the obligation.
Even the liberalization TEFRA represents is tempered to a degree
by more burdensome procedural requirements including public ap-
proval requirements66 and the reporting requirements imposed on In-
dustrial Development Bonds generally.67 The imposition of these and
other rules in TEFRA that require regulatory clarification may in-
crease the difficulty of issuing tax-exempt obligations at a time when
state and local governments have fewer economic development tools at
hand.68
Thrifts and Depository Institutions
Late in the second session, the 97th Congress passed and President
Reagan signed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act.69
This act culminates at least a decade of legislative and other efforts to
address the increasing problems of depository institutions. Although
this act may be "the most comprehensive piece of substantive banking
law to be enacted for 50 years,"' 70 it also has considerable impact on
housing. The thrust of the act, in part, is a salvage operation for those
institutions most closely involved with housing finance.
For a number of years those financial depository institutions whose
portfolios are tied primarily to long-term mortgages at low interest
66. TEFRA, supra note 58, at § 215.
67. Id.
68. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 169-70.
69. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(1982).
70. Vartanian & MeFarlane, FH.LB.B. Helps Bring About Major Changes in Thrfits, Legal
Times, Nov. 1, 1982, at 16.
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rates have been in serious difficulty.7' The present plight of thrift insti-
tutions shows how severely regulated firms are especially vulnerable in
periods of economic stress. 72 As Senator Garn noted in one of many
hearings, thrifts succeeded so well in making reasonably priced mort-
gages that they had no earnings for a year and a half.73 Savings and
Loan Associations (S&L's) suffered a particularly severe disintermedia-
tion into the new money market funds; both commercial banks and
thrifts have seen these funds grow to over $200 billion largely from
their depositors.74 The new Money Market Account authorized under
Garn-St. Germain are savings instruments designed to allow thrifts to
compete effectively with the money market funds. They have attracted
twenty-one billion dollars in net new savings to thrifts, but to date
thrifts are not putting much of this new money into housing. 75
Since the late 1970's various legislative proposals have targeted on
assistance to the thrift industry. During the same period depository
institutions have chafed at the heavy web of regulation that has limited
their options while outside their plate glass windows a whole new
financial supermarket opened up. The new entrants into the financial
services markets are unfettered by the regulations governing commer-
cial banks and thrifts. Major changes in demand for means of delivery
of financial services bypassed banks and savings and loans while those
institutions remained hampered by statutes and regulations enacted in
the 1900's and 1930's to meet problems that no longer are paramount.
The classic example, of course, is the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,76
passed to prevent banks from engaging in the underwriting of most
securities.77
In contrast, these new entrants, such as Shearson American Express,
are now offering travel agency services, cash management accounts,
real estate and insurance services, securities and money market funds,
credit cards, loans, and check writing. Sears, Roebuck & Co. has ac-
quired Coldwell Banker & Co., the largest real estate brokerage firm in
the country, and Dean Witter Reynolds, the fifth largest securities com-
pany. Similar positions are held by Merrill Lynch and the Prudential
Insurance Company. The problems that inflation, volatile interest
71. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 123.
72. Id
73. CapitalAssistance Act and.Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act: Hearings Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on S 2531 and S. 2532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1982) (opening statement of Senator Jake Gan, R-Utah, Chairman).
74. There was quite a dramatic reversal once interest rate ceilings were lifted on consumer ac-
counts. After the passage of Garn-St. Germain Act, the depository institutions could begin
paying interest rates of their choice as of December 14, 1982. In the first month of deregula-
tion, about $111 billion moved into this new type of account. The thrifts appear the primary
beneficiaries of the shift in the flow of money among competing financial institutions. See
Hill, Shift in Savings Flo ws May Help Individuals, Small-Firm Borrowers, Wall St. J., Jan. 21,
1983, at 1.
75. See New Money Market Accounts Don't Help Housing Much, BUILDER, April 1983, at 28.
76. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. chs. 3 and 6 (1976) (orginally enacted as Act of June 16,
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162).
77. Id. 48 Stat. at 165.
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rates, and excessive regulation have imposed on the depository institu-
tions have been exacerbated by this intense and increasing competition.
A number of provisions in the Garn-St. Germain Depository Insti-
tutions Act are particularly relevant to housing and the availability of
mortgage credit.
(1) Titles I and II provide the federal depository institutions' insur-
ance agencies with increased flexibility to aid troubled and financially
distressed institutions. They expand the forms of financial assistance
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (F.S.L.I.C.) could provide to
troubled institutions and extend the circumstances under which such
assistance can be granted. Title I also sets out procedures for the agen-
cies to follow to facilitate the acquisition or merger of failed or failing
institutions.
(2) Title II establishes an income capital assistance program whereby
institutions in trouble may issue capital instruments to be purchased by
the insuring agencies with promissory notes. This Net Worth Certifi-
cate concept is addressed specifically to those depository institutions
that have suffered earnings and capital losses primarily as a result of
their mortgage lending activities, and having net worth equal to or less
than three percent of their assets. Institutions receiving assistance
under this Title are not precluded from receiving assistance under
Title I.
(3) Title III significantly expands the investment powers of S&L's to
include the right to make commercial loans up to two percent of assets
(ten percent in 1984) and to make loans secured by nonresidential real
estate up to forty percent of assets.
(4) The Act authorizes a new, high interest rate account. Basically,
all types of customers will qualify; there will be no rate ceiling or dif-
ferential on these accounts; they will be federally insured and offered
by thrifts and by commercial banks. In December 1982, the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulatory Committee met and determined that as
of December 14, 1982, the depository institutions themselves could set
the interest rates they would pay on consumer accounts.
(5) Within Garn-St. Germain, the Alternative Mortgage Transactions
Parity Act insures that there will be parity between all lenders, regard-
less of state law provisions. Previously only federally chartered institu-
tions could engage in alternative mortgage transactions; now
nonfederally chartered lenders-any qualified housing creditors-will
be able to make, purchase, and enforce Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARM's) secured by interests in residential real property.
(6) State law is preempted to ensure that assisted state chartered
S&L's can continue to operate and pay dividends and that state
franchise taxes are suspended during the period of assistance.
The Depository Institutions Act does not go as far as many had
hoped it would. Although the act enlarges the lending powers avail-
able to savings and loans, it does not provide banks and thrifts full
access to the securities business.7" The act strengthens the banks by
78. That issue remains unresolved; Senator Gan held oversight hearings on Glass-Steagall is-
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allowing them to offer higher rates, to attract deposits back from money
market funds, and increases the potential for competition between
S&L's and small commercial banks. The act also provides federal aid
to troubled S&L's and banks, and broadens the powers of federal in-
surance agencies. 9
Due on Sale Clauses
Among the more important provisions of the Depository Institu-
tions Act is that which preempts all state restrictions on the enforce-
ment of due on sale clauses. Due on sale clauses were conceived to
protect the security of the mortgage lender.8" The concept originally
permitted the lender to declare the mortgage payable at any sale or
transfer if the new purchaser lacked financial capacity to assume the
original loan. As interest rates increased mortgagees began to use the
due on sale clause to renegotiate the mortgage at a higher rate.
Over the last decade over twenty states considered litigation involv-
ing the enforceability of due on sale clauses.8 The issue was brought
to a head in August of 1980 by a decision of the Federal National
Mortgage Association to begin enforcing the "due on sale" provision in
its conventional mortgages. The decision was to affect those mortgages
originating after October 1, 1980, and owned by FNMA. 2 After a se-
ries of court cases, the United States Supreme Court held that federal
savings and loan associations may enforce due on sale clauses in mort-
gage contracts despite state law to the contrary.83 The court said that
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in regulations allowing savings
and loan institutions to include due on sale clauses in home loan con-
tracts, 4 exercised authority provided by the Congress to ensure the
financial stability of local mutual thrift institutions. The court con-
cluded that the Board's intent to preempt state law was "unambigu-
ous." That certainty, in effect, has been underlined by Garn-St.
Germain.85
Garn-St. Germain provided an immediate and meaningful safe
harbor for the thrift industry, though it is not, nor does it purport to be,
a housing bill. Indeed, in eradicating the differential in interest paid by
banks and by thrifts, Congress has removed or obliterated the preferen-
sues April 6, 1983, with additional hearings to come. The House apparently is quite willing
for the Senate to take the initiative in this area; no House hearings are scheduled, and most
members of the House Banking Committee have not yet taken a position on the expansion of
Glass-Steagall.
79. See The Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act, Title I of Garn-St. Germain, supra note 69.
80. See Fidler, FNM.A Program: Negotiating the Variables, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar., 1983,
at 62.
81. See Brownstein & Schomer, Enforceability is Key Issue in "Due on Sale" Litigation, Legal
Times, Sept. 22, 1982, at 12..
82. 8 HOUsING & DEv. REI'. (BNA) 230 (Aug. 8, 1980).
83. Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)(1) (1982).
85. See "Preemption of Due on Sale Prohibitions," part C of The Thrift Institutions Restructur-
ing Act, title III of Garn-St. Germain, supra note 69, 96 Stat. at 1505.
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tial treatment housing has received over the years. While federal pre-
emption of due on sale restrictions is important to the holders of long-
term low rate mortgages, the enforcement of due on sale effects a seri-
ous constraint on the ability to sell existing homes.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
At least two questions occur in the context of the federal govern-
ment's direct responsibility for all housing. First, are there legislative
remedies available; that is, are there housing issues that could benefit
from legislative initiatives that would not have major budgetary im-
pact? Second, what impact will this shift in housing's priority have on
the shape of housing in the future?
One highly touted legislative remedy is to free current restrictions
on the use of pension funds for housing investment. The Housing
Commission Report recommended an almost absolute relaxation of
those restrictions that have precluded major pension fund investment
in housing and real estate. The primary barrier has been the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).8 6 While ERISA does not
set out specifically the investments a plan may or may not make, it does
define prohibited transactions and set out investment standards that
pension fund managers must meet. The intent of the Act and its lan-
guage have been constrained further by the regulations of the Depart-
ment of Labor under the Act. While a process of relaxation is taking
place, it is too soon to determine the impact on housing and real estate
investment; pension funds are never likely to provide an all-purpose
panacea for housing.
Other legislative alternatives include: a moderate-income multi-
family production program, condominium conversion policies, rent
control, urban enterprise zone legislation, and further easing of restric-
tions on pension plan investment in housing and real estate. There
may be changes in the community block grant program; states and lo-
cal governments may assume a stronger housing role under some ver-
sion of New Federalism.
For housing, the first quarter of 1983 brought welcome recovery.
Sales and starts were up as interest rates receded. The unquenchable
optimism of realtors, developers, and builders was heard again; there
was a certain euphoria in the claims of those who saw housing once
again "leading the recovery." A cautionary note may be in order. The
present burst of activity-an estimated 1.7 million starts-is not that
big a burst. To the degree it represents the pent up demand of
purchases delayed over the last two years, it is unclear how strong
housing activity will be. With conventional mortgages at 13-13 % at
this writing, the band of prospective purchasers remains a narrow one.
Interest rates may stiffen. Tax policies remain uncertain. The adminis-
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1381 (1976).
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tration and the economy still face a two hundred plus billion dollar
deficit. And consumer confidence has not rebounded as strongly as the
Administration had hoped; the 1980's may indeed be "the era of the
scared American [holding] the increasing belief that the future is not
going to be as good as the past."87 This country may not be able "to
provide housing at the scale and variety of configurations which we
have grown to accept as our right."88 We may see an increasing depen-
dence on existing housing stock, with new construction responding with
variations of the affordable house whose advent the industry has so
often announced. There may need to be a shift in consumer expecta-
tions; perhaps home ownership is not the optimum for all families.
CONCLUSION
The political and legislative record of the last two years demon-
strates a clear movement away from direct federal responsibility for all
housing. Most major bills of the 97th Congress that affected housing
were not, primarily, housing bills. The debate on housing issues in the
foreseeable future will be dominated by the enormous budget deficit
projections.
It is unclear at this point whether the President's New Federalism
will succeed in shifting assistance programs, including housing, back to
the states, either in the form of block grants or some other vehicle.89
The prospects for new initiatives, such as urban enterprise zones or the
Trust for Investment in Mortgages, is equally uncertain. The record of
the past session, however, provides little optimism that a coherent
housing policy will be forthcoming.
A chronology of housing legislation since the turn of the century
demonstrates a federal concern for two persistent issues: the needs of
the poor and the problems of the cities.9 The legislative record of the
97th Congress marks an abrupt about face in federal policies. Housing
and its financing institutions must struggle through a period of transi-
tion without the legislative buttress that has structured housing policy
for so long. The legislative directions from Washington represent an
inadequate response to current needs. They suggest as well that hous-
ing and the cities must address their problems in a changed and re-
stricted environment as they adjust to a reduced federal presence.
87. HousING FINANCE, supra note 9, at 32.
88. Id
89. Housing Funds, supra note 2.
90. See PRESIDENT's HOUSING COMMISSION REPORTS, S. Doc. No. 644, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1909). There is quite a contemporary ring to its recommendations: government loans to
build habitable dwellings; condemnation and purchase of slum properties by the govern-
ment; and the improvement or replacement of these properties so that inexpensive and
healthful housing would be available to the poor through rentals or purchases at reduced
interest rates.
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